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Case No. 20090272-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JESSE D. CLARK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
1 
Brief of Appellee 
1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction on an unconditional ple^ of guilty to aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 (West 
2004). R. 228-31. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code |Annotated § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
"' Within Indian country, state jurisdiction is limited to crime|s by non-Indians against 
non-Indians and victimless crimes by non-Indians.'" State v. R^ber, 2007 UT 36, % 9, 
171 P.3d 406 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2,| 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984) 
(citation omitted from original)). There is no allegation in this <j;ase that the victim was 
Indian. 
Issue 1. Did the trial court properly determine that it had jurisdiction over 
Defendant's criminal prosecution where Defendant failed to establish that he is an Indian? 
Standard of Review. Whether the district court has jurisdiction is a question of law 
reviewed on appeal for correctness without deference to the lower court. See Reber, 
2007 UT 36, \ 8; State v. Norris, 2007 UT 6, TJ10, 152 P.2d 293; State v. Nones, 2000 
UTApp211 , t5 , HP.3d709. 
Issue 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing rule 11 sanctions on 
defense counsel for failing to acknowledge that the Utah Supreme Court—in an appeal in 
which counsel appeared—had rejected the very claim advanced by counsel below? 
Standard of Review. "The standard of review for evaluating the denial or imposition 
of rule 11 sanctions involves a three-tiered approach: '(1) findings of fact are reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the 
correction of error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.'" Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, % 16, 15 
P.3d 1021 (quoting Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, f 10, 973 P.2d 422), reh 'g denied (Dec. 
5, 2000); accord Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, 
1J12, 214 P.3d 120; Buck v. Robinson, 2008 UT App 28, <h 5, 177 P.3d 648. 
Issue 3. Did the presiding judge properly determine that the motion and supporting 
affidavits seeking to disqualify Judge Payne were legally insufficient to establish bias or 
prejudice toward members of the Uintah Band? 
2 
Standard of Review. A claim of error in the denial of a motioh to disqualify a judge 
under rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, presents a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998) (citing 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant rules are included in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11; and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 1, 2006, Defendant—who was sixteen at the tirhe of the charged 
offense—was charged in adult court with attempted murder withlinjury, a first degree 
felony, or alternatively, aggravated assault, a second degree feloijy, with a gang penalty 
enhancement; carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class B| misdemeanor; 
obstruction of justice, a second degree felony; unlawful possession of alcohol by a minor, 
a class B misdemeanor; and mayhem, a second degree felony. R[. 001-006; see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (West 2004) (direct-file statute for juveniles sixteen years of age 
or older). Seventeen months later, the court dismissed the concealed weapon count, 
ordered briefing on the mayhem count, and bound Defendant oyer on the remaining 
counts, including the enhancement. R. 162-64. 
On December 11, 2006, Defendant, who claimed to be a meinber of the Uintah Band 
of Indians, filed a motion to disqualify Judge A. Lynn Payne bdsed on his prior decisions 
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in other criminal cases recognizing State jurisdiction over individuals claiming to be 
Indians by virtue of their membership in the Uintah Band. R. 12-19, 20-21. Judge Payne 
certified the motion to Judge John R. Anderson for review. R. 35-36. Judge Anderson 
noted that three of the four supporting affidavits were created for and pertained to a 
different legal case and were more than three years old. R. 39 (Ruling and Order at 1, 
attached in Addendum B). The affidavits were full of inadmissible testimony, explained 
Judge Anderson, and established neither prejudice nor bias. Id. Accordingly, Judge 
Anderson denied the motion. See id. at 2. Defendant sought interlocutory review of the 
decision in the Utah Supreme Court. R. 46-47. The petition was transferred to this 
Court, which denied it on April 13, 2007. R. 50-53, 71-72, 79. 
Two weeks later, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Reber, 2007 
UT 36, 171 P.3d 406 (attached in Addendum C). Defense counsel in this case also 
represented Reber. See id. Reber claimed, among other things, that the State lacked 
jurisdiction over him because he was an Indian by virtue of his 1/16 Indian blood and his 
membership in the Uintah Band, and because he had ancestors who were listed on the 
Ute Partition Act final termination roll. See id. at ^[ 22-23. The trial court—specifically, 
Judge A. Lynn Payne—had found that the State had jurisdiction over Reber, and a jury 
convicted Reber of aiding or assisting in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife. 
See id. at Tfl[ 1, 5. This Court vacated the convictions, holding that the State lacked 
jurisdiction because the matter involved an Indian victim—the Ute Indian Tribe. See id. 
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at Tf 6. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the crime v^as victimless and that 
Reber failed to establish his Indian status. See id. at f^ [ 10, 27. Specifically, the court 
held that there was no support for Reber's claim that 1/16th Indiaii blood qualified as a 
"significant degree of Indian blood." Id. at U 22. Even if it did, th(e court explained, 
Reber failed to establish his Indian status because his ancestors' IQSS of their legal status 
as Indians left Reber with "no Indian blood for purposes of being (recognized by an 
Indian tribe or the federal government." Id. at <[{ 23. In any events the court held, the 
Uintah Band in which Reber claimed membership was not recogrfized by the federal 
government, and Reber, therefore, had not established that he wa$ Indian for purposes of 
jurisdiction. See id. at ^[ 24-25. 
Three months after Reber issued, Defendant filed a motion to| stay this case pending a 
decision on the Reber certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court. R. 81-82. 
Defendant argued that a stay was warranted in this case because disposition of the issue 
raised in Reber's petition would be dispositive in this action[.]" |R. 82. One of the 
questions in that petition was whether Reber was, in fact, an Indian, as he claimed. 
Reber, 2007 UT 36, f7. The trial court granted a stay. R. 84-85). The United States 
Supreme Court denied Reber's petition on October 29, 2007. Rl 88; see U.S.S.Ct. 
Docket (Case No. 07-103) (attached in Addendum D). 
Defendant thereafter filed in the trial court a motion to dismiss this matter, reasserting 
his argument that "the State has no jurisdiction to prosecute crirtiinal offenses alleged to 
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have been committed by Indians within Indian country." R. 90-91, 92-130. He argued 
that he was an Indian based on his membership in the Uintah Band, but did not mention 
the Reber decision or make any effort to distinguish that case from this one. See id. The 
State's brief response cited only to Reber. R. 143-44. The trial court heard argument, 
then issued a written order denying the motion. R. 146-47, 149-56. 
Denial of Motion to Dismiss. Relying on Reber and the cases cited therein, Judge 
Payne explained that to establish Indian status, a defendant must (1) demonstrate that he 
has "a significant degree of Indian blood and (2) [be] recognized as an Indian by a tribe 
or society of Indians or by the federal government." Ruling and Order at 2 (attached in 
Addendum E) (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846)) (emphasis in J. 
Payne's ruling). The court determined that Defendant failed on both points. See id. at 2-
5. The court explained that Defendant adduced no evidence concerning his blood 
quantum except his relationship to Mr. Calvin Hackford, an uncle who Defendant 
claimed was a member of the Uintah Band of Indians. See id. at 2. That was insufficient 
to establish the first requirement absent any claim that either man had any Indian blood. 
See id. 
Neither did Defendant establish that he was recognized as an Indian by a qualifying 
tribe. See id. at 2-5. The Reber court had addressed the status of the Uintah Band and 
determined that the Band was "'not recognized as a tribe by the federal government^]"' 
leaving membership in that Band irrelevant to "'establishing] . . . Indian status under 
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federal law.'" Id. at 2-3 (quoting Reber, 2007 UT 36, H 24). Relying on Reber's 
determination that "'the Uintah Tribe no longer has a separate existence apart from the 
Ute Tribe'" and that, therefore, the Uintah Band is not a federally recognized tribe, Judge 
Payne ruled that Defendant's recognition by the Uintah Band doe$ not establish that he is 
recognized as an Indian by an Indian Tribe.1 Id. at 3. 
Imposition of Sanctions. In the same written order, the trial tiourt reviewed 
Defendant's motion to dismiss in light of rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. 
at 5-6. Rule 11 provides that by signing and filing a legal pleadirig, a party certifies that 
the claims therein "are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivc l^ous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law . . . . " Id. at (3 (quoting Utah R. Civ. 
P. 11(b)). The trial court noted that despite the fact that defense tounsel represented both 
Reber and Defendant, his motion to dismiss included no argument concerning blood 
quantum, as required by Rogers and Reber, made no reference t0 either Rogers or Reber, 
and made no request for reversal or modification of either case. See Add. E at 6-7. 
Thus, the trial court ordered counsel to show cause why he should not be found in 
violation of rule 11. See id. at 7. Defense counsel appeared an<|i argued the matter on 
May 12, 2008. R. 159-60. 
defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court challenging the 
denial of his motion to dismiss and sought a stay of the proceedings, including 
enforcement of sanctions against counsel, pending a decision. R. 189-91. No decision 
on this motion or resolution of the federal matter appears in thejrecord. 
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Judge Payne subsequently entered a detailed, nineteen-page ruling on the rule 11 
sanctions, explaining why the claims in the motion to dismiss were not warranted either 
"by existing law or by a[ny] nonfrivolous argument for extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law[.]" Ruling and Order (attached in Addendum F). The judge 
noted that Defendant was not entitled to relief under existing law because Rogers and 
Reber were "clearly" and unfavorably "dispositive" of all of Defendant's claims; counsel 
knew of the cases and their requirements but did not address them in his motion; and 
counsel made no "blood quantum" argument. Id. at 16-17. Neither did defense counsel 
argue for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, the judge explained. 
See id. Defense counsel did not cite to the existing law reflected in Rogers and Reber, 
address the legal principles in those cases, or provide analysis or argument for extension 
or modification of those cases. See id. at 17-18. Rather, defense counsel simply ignored 
the precedent, despite the fact that he represented both Defendant and Reber, See id. at 
18. Accordingly, the judge found that defense counsel's motion to dismiss "was 
frivolous; that counsel knew of the controlling law and knowingly avoided any 
discussion or analysis of that law; and that counsel failed to argue for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of the controlling law, or establishment of new law" in violation 
of rule 11(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 2. The judge imposed a $700.00 
sanction on defense counsel for the intentional violation. See id. at 19. 
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On November 10, 2008, Defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to an 
amended charge of aggravated assault, a third degree felony; the remaining charges were 
dropped. R. 206, 208-17. The court sentenced Defendant to a terfri of zero to five years 
in the State Prison, suspended the sentence, placed defendant in jill for 135 days, and 
placed him on probation for six years. R. 225-30. Defendant timely appealed. R. 235. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A thorough statement of the underlying facts is neither necessary to a determination 
of the issues raised on appeal nor available in light of the incomplete record before this 
Court. Defendant's written statement in support of his plea simply states: 
[0]n or about October 3, 2004, in Duchesne County, State of [Utah, while fighting 
with Len Duane Boren, [Defendant] stabbed him . . . with a knife. [He] knew it 
was illegal... to do so." 
R. 209. The crime occurred at a place known as Rock Creek Raflch in Duchesne County. 
R. 105-06; Br. of Aplt. at 12. Defendant claims that the locationlis within the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation, but the $tate did not concede the 
issue. R. 143. Judge Payne initially found it unnecessary to readh the issue. See Add. E 
at 1. Thereafter, in deciding the rule 11 issue, the judge explained that under the 
decisions in Reber and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S. Ct. |958 (1994), the offense 
in this case did not occur within the outer boundaries of a reservation because what was 
formerly the Uintah Indian Reservation no longer exists as such^  See Add. F at 6-8, 13. 
Consequently, Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-201(6)(c)—which detail$ when the State lacks 
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jurisdiction over criminal offenses involving Indians—would not apply because the 
offense was not committed in Indian country. See id 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant recognizes that the State lacks jurisdiction over a 
criminal matter when the crime is committed in Indian country and either the accused or 
the victim is Indian. Defendant argues that the State lacks jurisdiction because the 
charged offense was committed in Indian country and that he is Indian by virtue of his 
membership in the Uintah Band. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reber, 2007 UT 
36, 171 P.3d 406, held that the test for establishing Indian status for jurisdictional 
purposes requires proof that the individual: (1) has a significant degree of Indian blood; 
and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a federally-recognized tribe or by the federal 
government. Defendant attempts to transform that test into merely one of tribal 
affiliation. His argument is directly contrary to both Reber and United States Supreme 
Court precedent. Defendant provides no basis upon which this Court may depart from 
that precedent. Defendant's failure to argue below or on appeal that he has any degree of 
Indian blood defeats his claim of being an Indian for jurisdictional purposes. 
Issue II: This Court lacks jurisdiction to review defense counsel's challenge to the 
imposition of sanctions based on a violation of rule 11(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
10 
Procedure. The trial judge's final comment on the matter evidences his intent to further 
address the issue, leaving no final appealable order for review by tlhis Court. 
Alternatively, defense counsel's failure to address the basis foit the challenged ruling 
waives appellate review of the issue. The trial court's decision was based solely on a 
violation of rule 11(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defense counsel fails to 
address the rule on appeal. Accordingly, his challenge is waived. 
In any event, defense counsel fails to establish any error in thd imposition of 
sanctions. Assertion of claims simply for purposes of preservation does not diminish his 
obligations under rule 11. Neither does the reference to pertinent precedent in the State's 
written response bear on the rule 11 violation where the violation was complete upon the 
filing of Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Issue III: This Court need not reach Defendant's challenge t0 the denial of his 
motion to disqualify Judge Payne. Entry of Defendant's unconditional guilty plea 
waived appellate review of all nonjurisdictional, pre-plea matter$. In any event, the 
presiding judge properly rejected Defendant's motion and supporting affidavits as being 
insufficient to warrant disqualification of Judge Payne. The affidavits were largely 
generated for use three years earlier in State v. Reber, were full of conclusions, legal 
argument, and hearsay, and failed to establish the appearance oflbias or prejudice on the 
part of Judge Payne against the Uintah Band. Moreover, adverse rulings by the 
challenged judge do not establish bias for purposes of disqualification. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH HIS INDIAN STATUS 
Defendant contends that the State lacks jurisdiction to prosecute this matter because it 
"cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over a member of a federally recognized Indian 
tribe for acts committed on an Indian reservation." Br. of Aplt. at 15-19. In support, he 
argues: 
1. the State failed to prove that the offense occurred outside of tribal and federal 
jurisdiction; 
2. the Uintah Band is a separate body from the Ute Tribe because the Ute Tribe 
terminated the majority of Uintah Band tribal members who now govern the Band; 
3. the Uintah Band is a federally recognized tribe despite its omission from the 
federal list; and 
4. Defendant is a member of the Uintah Band of Indians. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 17-35. To prevail on his jurisdictional argument, Defendant must 
prove not only that the crime occurred on Indian land, but also that he is an Indian. See 
State v. Reber, 2007 UT 36, \ 9, 171 P.3d 406. His failure to establish the latter 
prerequisite is fatal to his entire argument.2 
2The State does not concede the question of whether the offense took place within 
Indian country. But the analysis herein makes it unnecessary to address that issue. 
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The law is clear that the State lacks jurisdiction over a criminall matter where the 
crime occurs in Indian country and either the accused or the victin^ is Indian. See id. The 
trial judge in this case did not reach the first point in denying the motion to dismiss 
because he found that Defendant failed to establish the second point. See Add. E at 1. 
The test for determining the second point was established by tike United States 
Supreme Court over one hundred and sixty years ago. See United States v. Rogers, 45 
U.S. 567 (1846). Rogers provides that a person claiming to be art Indian must establish 
two factors: (1) he must have "a significant degree of Indian blood and" (2) he must be 
"recognized as an Indian by a tribe or society of Indians or by the) federal government." 
Id. at 571-74 (emphasis added); see also State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 932 (Utah 1992). 
Rogers remains good law and was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Reber as the 
yardstick by which to measure Indian status. See Reber, 2007 UT 36, j^ 21. 
As to the first factor, the trial court held that Defendant did n^t claim "that he has a 
significant degree of Indian blood." Add. E at 2. He simply claibed to be related to "a 
senior member of the Uintah Band" without discussion of blood Itype or quantum. Id. In 
fact, defense counsel acknowledged below that the "only issue" presented by Defendant 
"is that the Uintah Band is federally recognized. He is not making an allegation based on 
blood quantum." R. 272:12. Consequently, the lower court he|d that Defendant's claim 
of being an Indian necessarily failed. See id. 
13 
Defendant makes no blood quantum argument on appeal, either. Instead, he argues 
that blood quantum is irrelevant because it symbolizes the idea of "race," which is not a 
yardstick for Indian status. See Br. of Aplt. at 24-25. The true measure of Indian status, 
he claims, is membership in an Indian tribe. See id.; R. 101-03. He claims that because 
the Ute Tribe terminated a majority of the Uintah Band, they necessarily terminated the 
Band as a whole, and that the Band now constitutes a separate "sovereign political 
community" which recognizes Defendant as a member, thereby establishing him as an 
Indian. See id at 24-28. 
Defendant's argument is contrary to established law. He ignores the first factor of the 
federal test for Indian status—blood quantum—and seeks to qualify as an Indian merely 
by establishing both alternatives in the second factor: recognition as an Indian by a 
federally recognized tribe or by the federal government. See Br. of Aplt. at 17-31; see 
also Reber, 2007 UT 36, *{ 26 & n.28; Perank, 858 P.2d at 932 (interpreting Rogers, 45 
U.S. at 572-73). In so doing, he does not cite to or otherwise acknowledge Rogers, in 
which the United States Supreme Court recognized the need for a significant degree of 
Indian blood as part of the test for determining Indian status for jurisdictional purposes. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 17-35. Neither does he supply any authority supporting the departure 
he advocates. See id. However, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court are bound 
by Rogers in determining Indian status for jurisdictional purposes. See Reber, 2007 UT 
36, \ 26 & n.28; Perank, 858 P.2d at 933. 
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Because Rogers requires proof of blood quantum before Indiari status may be 
established, and Defendant has provided no such evidence, he haslnot established his 
Indian status for jurisdictional purposes. Hence, the lower court properly denied his 
motion to dismiss. See Reber, 2007 UT 36, ]f 23 (defendant's claijm that the State lacked 
jurisdiction over him fails absent proof of Indian status).3 
II. 
THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL ORDER PREVENTS APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CHALLENGE TO THE 
IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS; ALTERNATIVELY, COUNSEL 
WAIVED APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE CLAIM, AND HE 
DEMONSTRATES NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE IMPOSITION 
OF SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO RULE 11(B)(2), UTAIf RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Defendant's appeal includes a challenge to the trial court's imposition of sanctions on 
his trial counsel.4 See Br. of Aplt. at 36-37. 
The imposition of sanctions was based on defense counsel's Violation of Rule 
11(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Add. F at L That rule provides: 
3The trial court goes on to address the remainder of Defendant's argument in 
detail. Review of that part of the lower court's order is unnecessary given the total 
absence of any evidence relating to blood quantum. See Rogersi 45 U.S. at 572-73; 
Reber, 2007 UT 36, \ 21 (noting that the test is in the conjunctive). However, the lower 
court's analysis fully and fairly addresses the matters before it aifid properly rejects 
Defendant's arguments below. See Add. E. 
4Defense counsel does not challenge the amount of the sanction, only the trial 
court's reasons for imposing it. See Br. of Aplt. at 36-37. 
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By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court . . . an attorney , . 
. is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law or the establishment of new law . . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).5 Judge Payne entered a nineteen-page, well-reasoned decision 
outlining in detail the background and legal precedent relevant to the issues of 
jurisdiction and Indian status (Add. F at 1-10); analyzed the dispositive nature of both 
Rogers and Reber (id at 10-12); explained why defense counsel's conclusory 
jurisdictional argument under section 76-l-201(6)(c) was "frivolous" in light of Rogers, 
Reber, and Hagen (id. at 12-13); and outlined the shortcomings in defense counsel's 
argument at the order to show cause hearing (id. at 13-15). 
The judge also addressed the specific requirements of rule 11(b)(2). First, he 
determined that defense counsel clearly met the requirement that he make a reasonable 
inquiry into existing law, as demonstrated by the fact that defense counsel regularly 
practiced "within this area of Indian law"; that he was counsel for Reber and clearly 
knew the contents of the Reber decision; that he had argued the relevant federal law in 
Reber, and that he "extensively addressed principles of Indian law" at the order to show 
cause hearing. Add. F at 15-16. The judge's observations concerning defense counsel's 
5The trial court noted that the clause pertaining to establishment of "new law" was 
inapplicable to this situation, and defense counsel does not argue to the contrary. 
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knowledge of relevant Indian law is amply borne out by the record R. 83, 90-130. The 
judge then explained that this extensive knowledge demonstrated that counsel's omission 
of controlling case law and statutes in the motion to dismiss "was hot a mere 
oversight[,]" but occurred because the law "did not support the Mbtion to Dismiss." 
Add. Fat 16. 
Second, the trial judge found that defense counsel could not Mve certified that the 
motion was permitted by existing law in light of Rogers and Rebef, which "were clearly 
dispositive of all the issues presented by Counsel." Add. F at 16-117. Defense counsel 
does not challenge this determination. See Br. of Aplt. at 36-37. 
Finally, the judge rejected defense counsel's claim that the motion to dismiss was 
intended to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. See Add. F at 18. Because defense 
counsel failed to cite to or argue either Rogers or Reber, failed to compare them to the 
present case, and failed to offer any analysis upon which this Cotirt could distinguish 
them, the judge was unable to find that the motion "was presentdd as a request to change, 
extend or reverse Rogers or Reber." Id. 
Accordingly, the judge concluded that defense counsel violated Rule 11(b)(2) when 
he filed the motion to dismiss, and held that, given counsel's fandiliarity with Indian law, 
his failure to raise Rogers and Reber was not negligent, but intentional. See Add. F at 
18-19. 
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Defense counsel argues on appeal that there was "no factual violation of any ethical 
rules" because he fully complied with rules 3.1 and 3.3, Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Br. of Aplt. at 36-37. Further, he argues that because his motion to dismiss 
was nothing more than a method by which to preserve his argument for federal review, 
he need only "cite[] the appropriate federal precedents in his motion to dismiss[,]" which 
he claims he did. Id. 
Lack of Jurisdiction. This Court is without jurisdiction to review defense counsel's 
challenge to the lower court's imposition of rule 11 sanctions because no final appealable 
order has yet been entered.6 
Following entry of Judge Payne's written ruling, Defendant filed a motion seeking a 
stay of both the criminal proceedings and the imposition of sanctions. R. 189-91. No 
ruling on this motion appears in the record. However, the minute entry for the 
subsequent hearing at which Defendant entered his guilty plea notes that "[t]he Court 
will take under advisement the contempt issue regarding" defense counsel and that a 
6The criminal matter is properly before this Court on direct appeal from the 
sentence and conviction. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, 57 P.3d 1065. Rule 11 
sanctions, however, "are a collateral issue and do not address the merits of the party's 
cause of action." Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Utah 1994) 
(citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396, 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990)); 
see also Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Utah 1991)(no relationship exists between 
imposition of sanctions and disposition of the underlying case on its merits). Further, the 
sanctions involve defense counsel's interests, not those of the Defendant. Hence, they 
may be reviewed separately. 
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ruling on the matter would occur at sentencing. R. 206. No further reference is made to 
the issue at sentencing or elsewhere. R. 225-27. 
Under rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court h$s jurisdiction over 
direct appeals arising "from all final orders and judgments[.]" Sek Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
A final order generally ends the litigation on the merits. See Matter of Estate of 
Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah App. 1997). An order whith anticipates further 
judicial action is interlocutory, not final. See, e.g., State ex rel S.M., 2006 UT 75, ^ 1, 
7, 154 P.3d 787 (order imposing rule 11 sanctions was non-final where it included an 
award of attorney fees that had not been determined); Swenson Associates Architects, 
P.G. v. State By and Through Div. of Facilities Const, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994) (a 
minute entry that anticipates further action is not a final appealable order); State v. 
Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, ^ 17, 21 P.3d 249 (addressing a ple^ in abeyance). "Where 
further action is contemplated by the express language of the ordbr, it cannot be a final 
determination susceptible of enforcement." State v. Leatherbury,\ 2003 UT 2, % 9, 65 P.3d 
1180. 
Here, Judge Payne's final mention of the sanctions against defense counsel clearly 
demonstrates his intent to further address the issue. R. 206. Consequently, the written 
order imposing sanctions cannot be a final order for purposes of appellate review, and 
this Court lacks jurisdiction to review defense counsel's challenge to that order. See 
State ex rel S.M., 2006 UT 75, ^ f 9 (dismissing on jurisdictional) grounds an appeal from 
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a non-final order imposing rule 11 sanctions); Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, % 11, 37 
P.3d 1070; Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989) 
("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss 
the action."). 
Waiver of Review. Defense counsel's challenge to the sanctions order also suffers 
from other deficiencies. First, review is waived where a party fails on appeal to address 
the basis upon which the lower court issued the ruling—here, Rule 11(b)(2). See State v. 
Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, ffif 21-24, 217 P.3d 1150 (failure to address on appeal the 
basis given by the trial court for the challenged ruling waives appellate review of the 
ruling), cert, denied, 225 P.3d 880 (Utah 2010). 
Judge Payne's order to show cause required defense counsel below to address rules 
3.1 and 3.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, together with rule 11(b)(2), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Add. F at 1-2. However, the judge ultimately based his 
ruling solely on rule 11. See id. Defense counsel's challenge makes no reference to rule 
11. See Br. of Aplt. at 36-37. Because defense counsel fails to address the basis for the 
challenged ruling, he waives appellate review of the decision. See Patrick, 2009 UT App 
226, Tf1f 21-24. 
Absence of Error. Second, defense counsel demonstrates no error in the challenged 
ruling. He contends that he fully complied with the relevant ethical rules by relying on 
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the State to argue the decision in Reber, and by "cit[ing] the appropriate federal 
precedents^]" Br. of Aplt. at 37. Neither argument has merit. 
A violation of rule 11 "is complete when the party files the pleading, motion, or other 
paper with the court[.]" Barton v. Utah Transit Authority, 872 P.2^11036, 1040 (Utah 
1994). Accordingly, the contents of the State's written response dannot absolve defense 
counsel of his obligations under rule 11(b)(2) and does not establish error in the lower 
court's imposition of sanctions. 
Further, defense counsel's inclusion of "appropriate federal precedents" in his motion 
to dismiss lacks any reference to the binding state and federal precedent directly contrary 
to Defendant's position. Judge Payne explained the relevance of Reber, Rogers, and 
Hagen and pointed out their absence from Defendant's motion. §ee Add. F, passim. 
Defense counsel does not challenge this determination, attempting instead to justify the 
missing authority by claiming that it is unnecessary when his argument is presented 
solely for preservation purposes. See Br. of Aplt. at 37. His claiin lacks any citation to 
supporting legal authority and is contrary to established law. Se$ Archuleta v. Galetka, 
2008 UT 76, Tf 16, 197 P.3d 650. In Archuleta, the Utah Supreme Court explained 
If counsel feel compelled to re-raise resolved or arguably resolved 
claims solely for purposes of preservation, they may do so, so long as those claims 
are properly identified as such. Resolved claims must be grouped and labeled in 
such a manner that they are evident as such to the trial court and to opposing 
counsel, with the clear indication that they are raised solely for the purpose of 
preservation. Further, previously raised claims must still allege an existing change 
in the law, a nonfrivolous argument for a change in the existing law, or some other 
equally reasonable justification. See Utah R. Civ. P. ll(b)(l)-(4). Counsel's 
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belief that there is an obligation to repeatedly re-raise resolved claims does not 
diminish the obligation to do so competently. 
Id. at ^ 16. Accordingly, preservation does not justify the total absence of any citation to 
contrary but binding legal authority on point in this case. 
In sum, the motion to dismiss in this case involved the same jurisdictional issue that 
was raised in the Reber case; defense counsel herein represented Reber and argued the 
relevant federal law in that case; the Reber decision issued prior to the filing of the 
motion in this case and resolved the issue contrary to Defendant; the motion herein made 
no reference to Reber or to the federal law presented to and relied on by the Reber court; 
and the motion contained no analysis upon which Judge Payne could rely to distinguish 
the ignored precedent. Under these circumstances, Judge Payne did not clearly err in 
determining that the motion did not present "a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of [uncited] existing law[.]" Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b); Add. F at 
18. Instead, he properly determined that defense counsel's pursuit of the motion was a 
violation of rule 11(b)(2) and, given counsel's familiarity with Indian law, his conduct 
was not negligent, but intentional. See Buck v. Robinson, 2008 UT App 28,119, 177 
P.3d 648 (presentation by a single defense counsel of the same failed legal argument to a 
different court in a different case, with knowledge of but no reference to contrary case 
law, violated rule 11(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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III. 
WAIVED DEFENDANT'S UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE NONJURISDICTIok\L PRE-
PLEA DISQUALIFICATION RULING; IN ANY EVENT, THE 
PRESIDING JUDGE PROPERLY FOUND THE MOTION AND 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS TO BE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT 
Defendant contends that Judge Payne should have been disqualified because his 
past rulings were adverse "to Indians in general and members of the Uintah Band in 
particular." Br. of Aplt. at 38-39. He argues that the judge has demonstrated a 
"consistent pattern over a period of years" demonstrating an appearance of bias sufficient 
to warrant disqualification. See id at 38-39. On appeal, Defendant challenges Judge 
Anderson's rejection of the affidavits supporting his disqualificalion motion, arguing that 
the "entirely separate matters" referenced in the affidavits are relevant to and supportive 
of the disqualification motion. Id. at 39. 
Waiver. This Court need not reach Defendant's claim because by entering an 
unconditional guilty plea, Defendant waived appellate review of i^ny pre-plea 
nonjurisdictional issue. 
"A defendant who pleads guilty is deemed to have admitted all of the essential 
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including 
alleged pre-plea constitutional defects." State v. Parsons, 781 Pid 1275, 1278 (Utah 
1989) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, If 13, 54 P.3d 645; 
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State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah App 1988) (entry of an unconditional plea "waives 
the right to appeal all pre-plea rulings"). Thus, entry of defendant's guilty plea 
extinguished his right to challenge the pre-plea ruling on Defendant's motion to 
disqualify Judge Payne. 
Merits. In any event, the motion was properly rejected as legally insufficient. 
Rule 29 permits a party to file a motion seeking disqualification of a judge. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 29(c)(1)(A). The motion must be accompanied by an affidavit which states 
"facts sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest." Id. The challenged 
judge may either grant the motion or certify it to a reviewing judge. Utah R. Crim. P. 
29(c)(2). "If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, 
filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another judge 
to the action . . . . " Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(3)(A). 
In this case, Defendant moved to disqualify Judge Payne and submitted four 
affidavits. R. 12-29. He argued that the affidavits demonstrated Judge Payne's 
"prejudice against the Uintah Band[.]" R. 18, 20. As mandated by rule 29(c)(2), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Payne certified Defendant's motion for review to the 
presiding judge, Judge Anderson. R. 35. Judge Anderson found the motion and 
supporting affidavits to be legally insufficient on several bases. First, the supporting 
affidavits (excluding that of defense counsel) were not prepared for purposes of this case, 
but were prepared more than three years ago for use in Reber. Add. B at 1. While this 
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factor alone does not make them irrelevant, it is a fact entirely appropriate for 
consideration by the judge. It was not, however, the sole basis for Judge Anderson's 
ruling. The judge also noted that the affidavits included "inadmissible testimony that 
lacks foundation, draws conclusions, lacks personal knowledge, hiakes legal argument, 
and/or relies upon hearsay." Id A review of the affidavits, including that of defense 
counsel, demonstrates the accuracy of Judge Anderson's observations. R. 22-29 
(attached in Addendum G). 
The particular complaints in the affidavits also failed to demonstrate the 
appearance of bias or prejudice, which is required for disqualification. All four affidavits 
lamented Judge Payne's focus on blood quantum evidence whenl considering whether an 
individual qualifies for Indian status. See Add. G. The affiants believed the issue to be 
irrelevant and disagreed with Judge Payne's previous rulings on I that point. See id. 
Defense counsel strenuously argued in his affidavit that the issu0 was irrelevant to the 
question of Indian status at both the state and federal levels. R. 112-19 (included in 
Addendum G). But as explained above, blood quantum is a required factor in the test 
for determining Indian status under both state and federal law, and Judge Payne's 
position is in keeping with that authority. See Point I, infra; sed also Rogers, 45 U.S. at 
572-73; Reber, 2007 UT 36, ^ 21 & n.20; see also Perank, 858IP.2d at 932. Hence, 
Judge Payne's position on blood quantum evidence does not warrant his removal from 
this case. 
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Further, the affidavits attempt to establish bias simply because of prior adverse 
rulings by Judge Payne. It is well-settled, however, that "bias cannot be inferred from an 
adverse ruling[.]" Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, 
p i , 214 P.3d 120; see also State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ^  31, 124 P.3d 235 (improper 
bias "'must usually stem from an extrajudicial source, not from occurrences in 
proceedings before the judge'") (quoting In re Inquiiy Concerning a Judge, 2003 UT 35, 
K 7, 81 P.3d 758) (internal quotations omitted). 
Neither was bias demonstrated by the affidavits' allegations that Judge Payne's 
adverse jurisdictional ruling in Reber was erroneous. The affidavits noted that the 
judge's jurisdiction determination was overturned by this Court on appeal, implying that 
the judge's decision was wrong and therefore biased. See Add. G. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that reversal on appeal could demonstrate bias in a trial judge, it did not do so 
in this case where the Utah Supreme Court subsequently reversed this Court's decision 
and reinstated the convictions, finding that the State in fact had jurisdiction over the 
defendants, as Judge Payne had originally ruled. See Reber, 2007 UT 36, j^ 27. 
Defendant also offers Judge Payne's sanctioning of his counsel in this case as 
evidence that he should have been disqualified. See Br. of Aplt. at 40. However, that 
matter was not before Judge Anderson as it had not yet occurred. Further, bias cannot be 
inferred from a trial court's decision to impose sanctions. See Edwards, 2009 UT App 
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185, ^ j 31. In any event, Defendant fails to establish how such a sanction demonstrates 
bias warranting Judge Payne's removal. 
Where none of the affidavits demonstrate that Judge Paynei is unable to "fairly and 
impartially determine the issue[s,]" they were properly rejected asl legally insufficient to 
warrant disqualification. Br. of Aplt. at 40 (quoting Ordei-ville Irrigation Co. v. 
Glendale Irrigation Co., VI Utah 2d 282, 409 P.2d 616, 621 (1966)); Add. G. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted May.^T > 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
L E 1 1 . SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND 
OTHER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT; SANC 
TIONS 
i) Signature. 
0(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at 
>t one attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented, by the party. 
0(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by 
as binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied 
affidavit or have a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule 
uires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the 
son may submit a declaration pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. If 
tatute requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signa-
e and the party electronically liles the paper, the signature shall be notarized 
rsuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16. 
a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is 
Tected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or 
ler paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), 
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 
owledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under 
3 circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
isting law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
v ^ r l ^ u ^ F l m ^ ^ 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support 
', if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
asonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
>ecifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
Jlief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 
3urt determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject 
) the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the 
ttorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are 
^sponsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be IT 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the spe< 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provide" 
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, withir 
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court 
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation 
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the c 
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses 
attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropi 
circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations c 
mitted by its partners, members, and employees. 
(c)(1)(B) On court 's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may ente 
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) 
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not vio 
subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violatk 
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such cor 
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limita 
in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, direc 
of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if impost 
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payme 
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other exp< 
incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented 
for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court 's initi 
unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismiss 
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or u 
attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the coi 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis fo 
sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this ru 
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, 
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
[Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1997; April 1, 2008.] 
CHANGE OF VENUE 
L) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom 
ial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that 
rt or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, 
n certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the trial, may, 
*ss otherwise disqualified, proceed with and finish the trial, but if the 
gned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge can 
ceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
>) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before 
Dm a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of 
court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge 
igned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may perform those 
ies. 
c)(l)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
qualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the 
tion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts 
ficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
c)(l)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not 
ir than 20 days after the last of the following: 
c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the 
)tion is based. 
[f the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion 
all be filed as soon as practicable. 
^c)(l)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certiTIc^tenohdeFTluIe 
, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to the 
ocedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion 
disqualify in an action. 
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, 
thout further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the 
otion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge shall take no further 
tion in the case until the motion is decided. If the judge grants the motion, 
e order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no 
esiding judge, the presiding officer ot the Judicial Council to assign another 
dge to the action or hearing. Assignment in justice court cases shall be in 
:cordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-138. The presiding judge of the 
)urt, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the 
-esiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and aflidavit are tin 
filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall as* 
another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or 
presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment in justice cc 
cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-138. 
(c)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge i 
consider any par t of the record of the action and may request of the judge i 
is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questi 
posed by the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a tir 
manner. 
(d)(1) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes th 
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the actio 
pending, either may, by motion, supported by an aliidavit setting forth h 
ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(d)(2) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affic 
are true and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for 
removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free Irom the objec 
and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith to the o 
in the other county. If the court is not satisfied that the representation 
made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order den 
the transfer or order a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and rec 
further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documenl 
record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge 
shall hear the case. 
[Amended effective July 22, 1999; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2006.] 
Addendum B 
B\ 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JESSE D. CLARK, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 061800204 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court upon certification of De-
fendant's Motion to Disqualify Judge A. Lynn Payne, filed Decem-
ber 11, 2006, and accompanied by supporting affidavits. The De-
fendant argues that these affidavits set forth "fact sufficient 
to show bias and prejudice'." Mot. 53. The Court first notes 
that three of the four affidavits (Calvin Hackford's, LaVae 
Hackford' s, and Richita Butler's) are more than three years old 
and were created in reference to entirely separate matters. 
Further, all of the affidavits are largely full of inadmissible 
testimony that lacks foundation, draws conclusions, lacks per-
sonal knowledge, makes legal argument, and / or relies upon 
hearsay. In particular, evidence of legal decisions overturned 
on appeal (even assuming such evidence were admissible in the 
form proffered) does not establish prejudice or bias. From 
the Court's review of the motion and related affidavits, the De-
fendant has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish 
prejudice or bias. 
000039 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, ]T IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the Defendant's motion is DENIED, and the case is referred 
back to the assigned judge. 
Dated this / ^ day of 4 £^1 
BY "'THE COURT: 
, 200?. 
1 JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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State of Utah, No. 20060299 
Plaintiff, Petitioner, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Rickie L. Reber; Tex William Atkins; 
and Steven Paul Thunehorst, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Petitioners. 
State of Utah, in the interest of No. 2006in304 
C.R., a person under 18 years of age. 
F I L E b 
April 241, 2007 
Eighth District, Vernal Dep't 
The Honorable A. Lynn Payne 
No. 021800320 
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Joannle C. Slotnik, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, Edwin T. Peterson, 
Vernal, for plaintiff 
Michael L. Humiston, Heber City, for) defendants 
and C.R. 
Kimberly D. Washburn, Draper, Tod J., Smith, Boulder, 
CO, Charles L. Kaiser, Charles A. Breer, Peter J. 
Hack, Denver, CO, for amicus Ute Indian Tribe 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice: 
fl The State seeks review of the court off appeals' 
decision vacating the convictions of Defendants Reber, 
Thunehorst, and Atkins. Reber was convicted of(aiding or 
assisting in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife in 
violation of Utah Code sections 23-20-4 and -23. Thunehorst and 
Atkins were each convicted of attempted wanton destruction of 
protected wildlife. The juvenile case against Reber's son, C.R., 
has been consolidated with this case for purposes of review. 
%2 In vacating the convictions, the court of appeals 
concluded that the State lacked jurisdiction. We disagree, and 
accordingly reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
f3 During the 2002 deer hunting season, Reber's son shot 
and killed a large mule deer with Reber's assistance. While 
transporting the deer, Reber was stopped at a checkpoint in 
Uintah County where the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources was 
checking for chronic wasting disease in deer. Conservation 
officers saw the large buck in the truck bed with no state 
hunting permit, license, or tag attached to the animal. Because 
Reber's son, C.R., had killed a trophy buck, the State charged 
Reber with aiding and assisting in the wanton destruction of 
wildlife, a third degree felony under Utah Code section 23-20-
4(3)(a). C.R. was referred to juvenile court. 
f4 During the same hunting season, Atkins shot a buck in 
Uintah County, and Thunehorst assisted him. They were both 
charged with class A misdemeanors under Utah Code section 23-2 0-
4(3) (b) . 
|^5 Reber filed a motion to dismiss his case, claiming that 
he is an Indian and was hunting in Indian country and that the 
State therefore lacked jurisdiction over him. Atkins and 
Thunehorst made the same claims but stipulated that the district 
court's ruling on Reber's motion would apply to their cases.1 
The district court denied Reber's motion, and a jury convicted 
him. Atkins and Thunehorst entered conditional pleas to class B 
misdemeanors. All three adult parties appealed to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, and their appeals were consolidated. C.R., also 
asserting a lack of State jurisdiction, was adjudicated 
delinquent on the same basis. He also seeks review. 
%6 The court of appeals vacated the convictions. The 
court noted that a state has jurisdiction over crimes that occur 
1
 Because Thunehorst and Atkins stipulated that rulings made 
with respect to jurisdiction and Indian status in Reber's case 
would be binding on them, we base our analysis on the facts in 
Reber's case. 
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in Indian country only if neither the defendant ikor the victim is 
Indian. The court of appeals determined that because the crimes 
did in fact occur in Indian country, and because the Ute Indian 
Tribe was the victim of the crimes, the State lacked 
jurisdiction. Having already determined that the State lacked 
jurisdiction, the court of appeals did not reach!defendants' 
Indian status claims. 
f7 We granted certiorari to determine whether, due to 
either a regulatory interest over hunting or a property interest 
in wildlife, the Ute Indian Tribe is a victim of illegal hunting 
within Indian country. We also granted certiorari to determine 
whether Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that they are 
Indians and, as such, are outside the jurisdiction of the State 
for acts committed in Indian country. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1f8 On certiorari, we review the decision bf the court of 
appeals, not that of the the trial court.2 Whether the district 
court or the juvenile court has jurisdiction is a question of law 
that we review for correctness, giving no deferejnce to the lower 
court.3 
ANALYSIS 
1[9 All parties agree that the land on whi 
occurred in this case was part of Indian country] 
federal statute.4 The United States Supreme Cou 
the extent to which states may exercise jurisdic| 
committed in Indian country. "Within Indian 
jurisdiction is limited to crimes by non-Indians| 
Indians and victimless crimes by non-Indians."5 
not committed against a unon-Indian." Either 
here are victimless, or the victim is the Ute Iridi 
|ch the crimes 
as defined by 
t has described 
tion over crimes 
state 
against non-
This crime was 
acts charged 
an Tribe. 
coun t ry 
t h e 
i 
2
 S t a t e v . N o r r i s , 2007 UT 6, 1 10, 152 P.3|i 293 . 
3
 Id^ . 
4
 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (MT]he term % Indian country' . . . means 
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-off-way running 
through the reservation . . . .") . 
5
 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984; 
omitted") . 
(citation 
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Consequently, the State has jurisdiction only if Defendants are 
non-Indians and if this was a victimless crime. 
110 The court of appeals concluded that u [b]ecause 
Defendant's acts of hunting on Indian country affected the Ute 
Tribe's regulatory interest, the tribe is the victim."6 The 
court also suggested that, in addition to the regulatory 
interest, Ma]n argument might also be made that the Ute Tribe 
had a property interest in the wildlife" sufficient to make it 
a victim.7 We disagree and conclude that Defendants are non-
Indians who committed a victimless crime within Indian country 
but not on Indian land and that, therefore, the State has 
jurisdiction. 
I. DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A VICTIMLESS CRIME 
A. The Ute Tribe's Regulatory Interests Were Not Violated 
til All parties agree that the animals were killed in 
Indian country. Indian country is defined by Congress in 18 
U.S.C. section 1151 as lands within the historic tribal 
boundaries. Indian country today may, and often does, include 
lands lawfully held in fee by non-Indians, as well as lands held 
by tribes, Indians individually, or others in trust for Indians. 
It may also contain, as in this instance, federal lands under the 
auspices of the Bureau of Land Management or the National Forest 
Service. 
tl2 With respect to the Indian country border that 
encompasses the scene of these crimes, and the character of the 
contained land, there has been much litigation. Defendants argue 
that under the most recent decision on this issue, Ute Indian 
Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Utah ("Ute Tribe V"),8 the 
State of Utah has no jurisdiction in this case. It does, in 
fact, appear that Ute Tribe V offers support for Defendants' 
position. In that case, the United States Circuit Court for the 
Tenth Circuit states, w[T]he Tribe and the federal government 
retain jurisdiction over all trust lands, the National Forest 
Lands, [and] the Uncompahgre Reservation . . . .9 The State 
6
 State v. Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 1 11, 128 P.3d 1211. 
7
 Id. at n.3 
8
 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997). 
9
 The Uncompahgre Reservation is now the southern section of 
(continued...) 
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[has] jurisdiction over the fee lands removed frcbm the 
Reservation under the 1902-1905 allotment legislation."10 
Hl3 Were we to accept Defendants' reading ct>f Ute Tribe V, 
the State of Utah would be without jurisdiction, since it is 
undisputed that the crimes took place within the original 
boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reservation. However, the crime 
scene was either on lands owned by the State or on National 
Forest land, miles from the nearest land owned by any Indian or 
Indian tribe. Nevertheless, the language of UtelTribe V gives us 
pause. 
Hl4 Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has given 
further guidance. In Montana v. United States,11 the Court held 
that an Indian tribe's authority to regulate fishing and hunting 
"only extend[s] to land on which the Tribe xexercises absolute 
and undisturbed use and occupation'" and "that power cannot apply 
to lands held in fee by non-Indians."12 
i|l5 We are compelled to read Montana to saK^  that there is a 
jurisdictional difference between "Indian country" and "Indian 
lands" or "Indian property owners."13 The Court [concluded that 
"[s]ince regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of a 
tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear 
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, the 
general principles of retained inherent sovereignty [do] not 
authorize" a tribe to adopt a resolution regulating hunting and 
fishing.14 In other words, the Ute Tribe has no regulatory 
authority to be offended by acts of Defendants here because the 
acts did not take place on Indian land over which the tribe 
claimed, or could claim, regulatory authority ovler hunting and 
fishing.15 
9(...continued) 
today's Uintah and Ouray reservation. United Spates v. Von 
Murdock, 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 1997). 
10
 Ute Tribe V, 114 F.3d at 1530. 
11
 450 U.S. 544 (1981) . 
12
 IdL. at 558-59. 
13
 IcL. at 563 n.12. 
14
 See id. at 564-65. 
15
 Further, in Solem v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court 
(continued...) 
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fl6 Although the crimes in this case took place in Indian 
country, it is undisputed that the land on which the crimes took 
place is not owned by any Indian or Indian tribe. Because the 
Supreme Court has held that Indian tribes have no authority to 
regulate hunting and fishing on non-Indian-owned land, we must 
conclude that the Ute Tribe has no regulatory interest over 
hunting by non-Indians on this land.16 As such, the court of 
appeals incorrectly relied on that regulatory interest as the 
basis for concluding that the Ute Tribe was a victim. 
B. The Ute Tribe's Property Interests Were Not Violated 
1(17 In addition to having no regulatory interest in hunting 
on the land in question, the Ute Tribe has no property interest 
in living, roaming wildlife on the land. Again, we rely upon the 
authority of the United States Supreme Court. The Court has said 
that 
it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild 
fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States 
nor the Federal Government, any more than a 
hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to 
these creatures until they are reduced to 
possession by skillful capture.17 
%1S Federal courts have applied the same analysis to Indian 
tribes: "The fact that fish and game are presently upon an Indian 
reservation does not negate the state interest in conserving them 
. . . ,"
18
 Moreover, u [a] tribe cannot claim to 'own' the fish 
and game on the reservation."19 And if not on Indian land, then 
surely not on non-Indian-owned land. Accordingly, Defendants' 
15
 ( . . . continued) 
indicated that states have jurisdiction over victimless crimes 
committed by non-Indians in Indian country. 465 U.S. 463, 465 
n.2 (1984). This crime fits that categorization. 
16
 The Ute Tribe, present and represented by counsel as 
amicus before us, disclaimed any such regulatory interest. 
17
 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 
(1977). 
18
 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, Dep't of Game & 
Fish, 649 F.2d 1274, 1283 (9th Cir. 1981). 
19
 Id. 
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acts did not violate any property interest of th^ Ute Tribe in 
the wildlife. 
1|19 Because the Ute Tribe neither has, nor 
authority to regulate hunting on the land within 
at issue in this case, and because the Tribe als< 
protected property interest in wildlife, the Ute 
and cannot be, a victim of these crimes. Other 
itself, these crimes have no victims. These are J 
victimless crimes within Indian country but not 
claims, 
Indian country 
• has no 
Tribe is not, 
tthan the wildlife 
then, 
Indian land. 
II 
on 
DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY ARE INDIANS 
f20 Defendants claim to be Indians. We conclude that they 
are not, as that term has been defined by federal law. 
1[21 In the 1846 decision United States v. feogers,20 the 
Supreme Court established factors to be evaluated in determining 
Indian status. Courts, including ours, have concluded that under 
Rogers, in order to claim the status of an Indian, ^  person must 
"(1) [have] a significant degree of Indian blood and (2) [be] 
recognized as an Indian by a tribe or society of Indians or by 
the federal government."21 Defendants do not meet either of 
these requirements. 
i[22 In applying the Rogers factors, we recognized in Perank 
that a person "with less than one-half Indian blood [can qualify 
as having] a significant degree of Indian blood, r'22 However, we 
have found no case in which a court has held that l/16th Indian 
blood, as claimed by defendants, qualifies as a ("significant 
degree of Indian blood." 
1(23 Even were we to conclude that l/16th 
the requirement in Rogers, defendants would stil 
establish their Indian status. Defendants' ancel 
which they claim Indian blood, were individually 
Ute Partition Act final termination roll.23 In IJ 
ind ian blood meets 
II fail to 
[stors, through 
listed on the 
nited States v. 
20
 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846); see State v.| Perank, 85$ 
P.2d 927, 932 (Utah 1992). 
21
 Perank, 858 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added) 
22
 Id. at 933. 
23 25 U.S.C. § 677. 
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Von Murdock,24 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, in addressing the operation and effects of the Ute 
Partition Act, concluded that an individual born to "parents 
[who] were listed on the final roll [of the Act]" was "not a 
member of the Ute Indian Tribe."25 "'Nor can the children of a 
terminated [parent] claim membership in the tribe through [that] 
parent.'"26 Because Defendants' ancestors lost their legal 
status as Indians, Defendants have no Indian blood for purposes 
of being recognized by an Indian tribe or the federal government. 
They therefore fail the first element of the Rogers test. 
1(24 Defendants also fail the second element of the Rogers 
test. The Uintah Band, in which they claim membership, is not 
recognized as a tribe by the federal government. As a 
consequence, Defendants' claimed membership in that tribe does 
not help establish their Indian status under federal law. The 
Tenth Circuit directly addressed this impact in Von Murdock, 
saying, 
The [Ute Tribe] Constitution thus makes clear 
that the Bands ceased to exist separately 
outside the Ute tribe, that jurisdiction over 
what was formerly the territory of the Uintah 
Band was to be exercised by the Ute Tribe, 
and that the rights formerly vested in the 
Uintah Band were to be defined by the Ute 
Constitution and exercised by the Ute Tribe. 
In light of these provisions, [the] argument 
that the Uintah Band's hunting and fishing 
rights retain a separate existence and belong 
only to the Uintah Band is groundless. Even 
if . . . the Uintah Band continues to 
maintain its own identity, under the Ute 
Constitution the Band does so only within the 
context of the Ute Tribe.27 
f25 This same analysis applies to the defendants in this 
case. Defendants concede that they are not members of the Ute 
Tribe. They claim to be members of the Uintah Band or Tribe. 
24
 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997). 
25
 IcL_ at 536. 
26
 Id. (quoting Chapoose v. Clark, 607 F. Supp. 1027 (D, 
Utah 1985)) . 
27
 IcL. at 541. 
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However, under federal law, the Uintah Tribe no longer has a 
separate existence apart from the Ute Tribe. As |a result, 
Defendants do not belong to a federally recognized tribe and are 
not Indians under federal law. 
f26 We are bound by the determinations of tthe United States 
Supreme Court and the Rogers decision. Further, we are not at 
liberty to decide which individuals are or should be "recognized 
as an Indian" by Indian tribes or the federal government. Such 
recognition is at the discretion of those entities.28 We 
conclude that, under Rogers, Defendants have failed to establish 
that they are Indians. Defendants do not have ua significant 
degree of Indian blood," nor are they "recognized as . . . 
Indian [s] by a [federally recognized] tribe or scpciety of Indians 
or by the federal government."29 
CONCLUSION 
[^27 The State has jurisdiction over these 
state has jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
when a non-Indian commits a victimless crime. D 
Indians, as that term has been defined by federa 
crimes in these cases were victimless. Accordingly, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
convictions. 
efendants. A 
ndian country 
fendants are not 
law, and the 
i|28 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, 
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Jubtice Wilkins' 
opinion. 
28
 If an individual wishes to establish Indian status before 
this court, he must seek recognition as an Indian from a 
recognized Indian tribe. If, as is the case here, an entire 
tribe seeks to be recognized, the tribe must look to the federal 
government for recognition. Absent federal approval, we are not 
in the position to recognize new tribes, and we Imust, in 
accordance with Rogers, find against Indian staqus. 
29
 Perank, 858 P.2d at 932. 
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Addendum E 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
APR 2 2 2008 
J Q A M J ^ 
BY. 
E, CLEP.K 
.DEPUTY 
VJ 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STA^E OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
Jesse D. Clark, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 061800204 
Judg$ A. LYNN PAYNE 
. 
In this matter the Defendant has moved that the court dismiss 
the case for lack of jurisdiction. The basis of this motion is that: 
(1) the offense occurred within Indian Countriy (Def.'s Mem., para. IV. 
p. 7); (2) the Ute Partition Act expelled the Uintah Band from the Ute 
Tribe (para. V. p. 8); (3) the Uintah Band is) a federally recognized 
tribe (para. VI, p. 9) ; (4) the expelled Uintfah Band has a right to 
determine its own membership (para VII A, p. 10); and (5) the 
Defendant is a member of the Uintah Band (paifa. VII B, p. 10) . 
The State claims that the motion should be denied because the 
Defendant has failed to show that the Defendant is an Indian. I 
agree. Although the State does not concede that the alleged offense 
occurred within Indian Country, the issue as to Indian status is so 
clear that the court believes it unnecessary to resolve whether the 
crime occurred in Indian Country prior to rutLina on the motion. 
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More than one hundred and sixty years ago the U.S. Supreme Court 
established two factors used to determine who is an Indian. U.S. v. 
Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846); see State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 932 
(Utah 1992) . Under Rogers, a person is considered an Indian if they 
Ml) [have] a significant degree of Indian blood and (2) [be] 
recognized as an Indian by a tribe or society of Indians or by the 
federal government." Perank, 858 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added). The 
Utah Supreme Court recently cited Rogers as the controlling authority 
when determining Indian status. State v. Reber, 171 P. 3d 406, 410 
(Utah 2007). 
Here, the Defendant does not claim that he has a significant 
degree of Indian blood. The only information that has been provided 
concerning the Defendant is that he is the great-nephew of Calvin 
Hackford. Mr. Hackford claims to be a senior member of the Uintah 
Band of Indians. No claim is made that either Mr. Hackford or Mr. 
Clark is a member of the Ute Tribe. Indeed, no claim is made that 
either Mr. Hackford or the Defendant has any Indian blood for the 
purpose of determining jurisdiction over Indians. Therefore, the 
court cannot recognize the Defendant as an Indian. 
To meet the second requirement for Indian status (recognition by 
an Indian tribe) the Defendant claims that he has been recognized as 
an Indian by the Uintah Band of Indians. The Reber decision clearly 
addressed the status of the Uintah Band. Id. In Reber, the court 
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held: Mt]he Uintah Band, in which they claim membership, is not 
recognized as a tribe by the federal government. As a consequence, 
the Defendants7 claimed membership in that tribe does not help 
establish their Indian status under federal lalw." Id. at 410. The 
Reber court cited with approval the 10th Circuit case of U.S. v. Von 
Murdock which held that the identity of the separate bands of Indians 
which comprise the Ute Indian Tribe (including the Uintah Band) 
"ceased to exist separately outside the Ute ttfibe." 132 F.3d 534, 541 
(10th Cir. 1997) . The Reber court then concluded that "the Uintah 
Tribe no longer has a separate existence apart from the Ute Tribe. As 
a result, Defendants do not belong to a federally recognized tribe and 
are not Indians under federal law." Reber, 1J71 P. 3d at 410. Based 
upon the Reber decision, the Defendant cannot rely on recognition by 
the Uintah Band to establish the requirement (in Rogers that he has 
been recognized as an Indian by an Indian Tribe. 
The Defendant's argument that the Ute Partition Act (25 U.S.C.S. 
§677 et seq. ; herein "UPA") expelled the Uintlah Band is also flawed. 
The Defendant argues that 76.4% of the Uintah Band was expelled from 
the Ute Tribe in consequence of the UPA (51.5|% of the members of the 
Uintah Band and an additional 24.9% who were [not enrolled members, but 
were eligible for membership) . Relying on principles of majority 
rule, the Defendant argues that when a majority of a tribe is expelled 
the Tribe itself is expelled. Therefore, th3 Defendant argues that 
000151 
the Uintah Band was expelled from the Ute Indian Tribe and continues 
to exist as a separate entity apart from the Ute Indian Tribe. 
The Defendant's argument is flawed for at least two reasons. 
First, as .ReJber makes clear, the Uintah Band ceased to exist as a 
separate entity in 193 7 when the Uintah Band joined two other tribes 
in adopting a constitution as the "Ute Indian Tribe." 171 P.3d at 
410. Consequently, when the UPA was enacted in 1954 there was no 
Uintah Band to be expelled from the Ute Tribe. 
Second, the UPA states that upon termination, "[a] 11 statutes of 
the United States which affect Indians because of their status as 
Indians shall no longer be applicable to such member over which 
supervision has been terminated, and the laws of the several States 
shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply to other 
citizens within their jurisdiction." 25 U.S.C.S. §677v. The UPA 
clearly grants the State jurisdiction over all individuals who were 
listed in the termination proclamation, including the 51.5% claimed by 
the Defendant. Congress has plenary power to legislate with respect 
to Indians and Indian tribes, and the power to determine the status of 
individuals as Indians for jurisdictional purposes. Therefore, the 
UPA did not expel Indians from £he Ute Tribe (or the Uintah Band); it 
terminated the status of those listed on the termination roll as 
Indians and declared that such individuals would be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the various states. 
The UPA has specifically determined that Certain individuals will 
not be considered as Indians and has determined that the individual 
states will have jurisdiction over these individuals. Such 
individuals may not regain Indian status through membership in any 
tribe. In view of the Federal Statute, Indian| status can only be 
returned through legislation by congress. 
Finally, even if the court were to accept the arguments of the 
Defendant which are based on voting rights, it appears that none of 
the 76.4% who Defendant claims have been expelled had any rights to 
vote. The 51.5% who were members of the Uintah Band and whose Indian 
status was terminated clearly could not vote. The remaining 24.9% who 
the Defendant claims were eligible for membership could not vote 
because they were not members. Persons who maty be eligible for 
memberships are not members and cannot vote. Finally, it cannot be 
fairly said that individuals who are not members of a Tribe have been 
expelled. 
The Defendant has failed to show a significant degree of Indian 
blood and has failed to establish that he has been recognized as an 
Indian by an Indian tribe. Therefore, he has not established that he 
has Indian status under Rogers and Reber. Thfe Defendant's motion is 
denied. 
After review of the Defendant's motion the court is concerned 
about whether the motion meets the requirement of Rule 11 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule states: 
By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to 
the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating) , an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying 
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances, 
(b) (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law 
The court is concerned with counsel for Defendants failure to 
include in his memorandum an argument for an extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law as is required by Rule 3.1 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Also, the court is concerned that counsel did 
not disclose to the court controlling authority {Rogers and Reber) as 
required by Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Here, Mr. Humiston was counsel in the Reber case and clearly had 
personal knowledge of the Reber ruling that the Uintah Band does not 
have a separate existence apart from the Ute Tribe. In addition, the 
Reber court also cited to the Rogers requirement that to establish 
Indian status one must have a significant degree of Indian blood. It 
is a concern to the court: (1) that counsel failed to address the 
issue of Indian blood as required by Rogers and Reber; (2) that he did 
not disclose controlling authority {Reber) concerning the status of 
the Uintah Band as a separate entity apart from the Ute Tribe; and (3) 
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that he made no attempt to argue for an extension, modification, or 
reversal of the controlling authority in Roger\s and Reber. Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. 
Humiston is ordered to appear before this cour|t 
on MtZc*2 IZ} lo«*S to show cause as to why the court should not 
find him in violation of Rule 11. 
i£ Dated this / J day of ftffv?1^ 2 0 0 8 . 
BY THE COURT: 
Hfy 
A. LYNN PAYNfc, Distr ict Court Judge 
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Addendum F 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
JUi^ 19 2008 
JO«:<f'ijE WcKEE, CLERK 
« DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STAT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Jesse D. Clark, 
Defendant. 
'T COURT 
'E OF UTAH 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case too. 061800204 
Judge A. LYNN PAYNE 
This matter comes before the Court on the| Court's order for Mr. 
Humiston (herein * Counsel") to show cause as t|o why he should not be 
found to have violated Rule 11(b) (2) of the Utlah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rule 11(b)(2) mandates that the "claims, lefenses, and other 
legal contentions are warranted by existing lajw or be a nonfrivolous 
argument for the extension, modification, or ifeversal of existing law 
or the establishment of new law." Utah R. CiV. P. 11(b) (2) . 
In this matter, Counsel filed a motion tcf dismiss which rested on 
two premises: (1) that the "Uintah Band" is a federally recognized 
Indian Tribe; and (2) the Defendant's membership in the Uintah Band 
alone is enough to deprive the State courts o$ jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 1152. Def.'s Memo, in Support Mot. dismiss p. 9-10 (Dec. 12, 
2007). The order to show cause directed Counsel to address his 
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obligation under Rules 3.1 and 3.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Rule 11(b)(2). The Court will only rule on Rule 11(b)(2). 
On May 12, 2008, Counsel appeared and responded to the order to 
show cause. Based on the facts and circumstances, the Court finds 
that the motion was frivolous; that Counsel knew of the controlling 
law and knowingly avoided any discussion or analysis of that law; and 
that Counsel failed to argue for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of the controlling law, or establishment of new law. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Counsel violated Rule 11(b) (2) in 
filing the motion to dismiss. 
Background and Authorities 
1. Congress has plenary power with respect to Indian tribes. 17.5. v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
2. Congress has reserved criminal jurisdiction to Indian tribes where 
the defendant or victim is an Indian and the crime occurs within 
"Indian Country." 18 U.S.C. § 1151-1152. 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 does not define who is an Indian for purposes of 
criminal jurisdiction within "Indian Country." 
4. In 1846, the U.S. Supreme Court defined "Indian" for the purposes 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1152 as a person who (1) has a significant degree of 
Indian blood; and (2) has been recognized as an Indian by a tribe or 
society of Indians or by the federal government. U.S. v. Rogers, 45 
U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846). The Rogers test for determining who is an 
Indian for the purposes of criminal law jurisdiction has been accepted 
and applied in state and federal courts. See U.S. v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 
770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Bruce, 394 F,.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 
2005); St. Cloud v. U.S., 702 F. Supp. 1456, lft60 (D. S.D. 1988); 
State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990|) ; State v. Attebery, 
519 P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974). This Court is nbt aware of any case law 
which has held that the requirements of Rogers are met by proof of 
tribal membership alone; nor has Counsel cited to any such authority. 
5. The Utah Supreme Court has specifically relcognized Rogers to be 
the controlling authority in determining Indialn status for the 
purposes of criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S|.C. § 1152. State v. 
Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 932 (Uuah 1992). 
6. In State v. Reber, the Utah Supreme Court lagain cited and applied 
Rogers as the controlling authority in determijning Indian status: 
"Courts, including ours, have concluded that linder Rogers, to claim 
the status of an Indian, a person must x(1) [have] a significant 
degree of Indian blood and (2) [be] recognized as an Indian by a tribe 
or society of Indians or by the federal government.'" 171 P.3d 406, 
410 (Utah 2007). 
7. The Reber Court observed that it was "boui|d by the determinations 
of the United States Supreme Court and the Rogers decision." Id. 
This Court and Counsel are similarly bound by the Rogers precedent, as 
well as the Utah appellate court cases (including Reber) which have 
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followed Rogers. 
8. In Reber, the Utah Supreme Court also found that the Reber 
defendants did not meet the second element in Rogers (recognition): 
"The Uintah Band, in which they claim membership, is not recognized as 
a tribe by the federal government. As a result, Defendants' claimed 
membership in that tribe does not help establish their Indian status 
under federal law." Id. (emphasis added). 
9. Counsel represented Mr. Reber before the Utah Supreme Court. 
Therefore, he was fully aware of the holdings in the Reber case. 
Counsel was also aware of the Rogers requirements because the Reber 
opinion cited Rogers as controlling authority. 
10. Although Counsel was aware that a person must have a significant 
degree of Indian blood to establish Indian status under Rogers, 
Counsel did not claim that the Defendant here, Mr. Clark, was an 
Indian or had any Indian blood. 
11. Counsel knew that the issue of Indian status was controlled by 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 because he listed this issue as his first issue in his 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. Also, Counsel cited 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 as controlling authority in his table of authorities, 
and referred to the case law interpreting § 1152 {Solem v. Bartlett, 
465 U.S. 463, 465 (1984)) in the introduction to his Memorandum. 
Nevertheless, having raised the issue as his first issue and in the 
first sentence of his Memorandum he never again returned to the issue 
000170 
and failed to give any analysis or make any argument as to how Mr. 
Clark met the requirements for Indian status uijider 18 U.S. C. § 1152. 
12. In his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Counsel did 
not: (1) cite to the Rogers or Reber cases; (21 raise the principles 
of law decided in Rogers or Reber; or (3) give any analysis or 
argument in support of an extension, modification, or reversal of 
Rogers or Reber. (The provision in Utah R. Cif. P. 11(b)(2) which 
allows for the creation of new law does not ap£>ly here. In light of 
Reber and .Rogers, any holding contrary to thosfe cases would be a 
reversal, extension or modification of those c^ses and would not be 
entirely new law). 
13. In his Memorandum, Counsel cited Utah Codfe Ann. § 76-1-201(6)(c) 
as authority for the proposition that tribal membership alone was 
enough to deprive the State courts of jurisdiction. Def.'s Memo, in 
Support Mot. Dismiss p. 10. This statute provides that State courts 
do not have jurisdiction over criminal offense|s where "the Indian 
tribe has a legal status with the United Statejs or the state that 
vests jurisdiction in either tribal or federal courts for certain 
offenses committed within the exterior boundaries of a tribal 
reservation. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-2031 (6) (c) . This statute 
was referred to in the table of authorities arid in the Memorandum's 
concluding sentence (which merely concluded that the Defendant had 
satisfied the requirements of the statute ) . 'ihe Memorandum did not 
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give any analysis of the requirements of the statute or how those 
requirements had been met in this case. The statute requires that 
uthe Indian tribe has a legal status with the United States". Id. 
Counsel did not cite to EeJber, which held that the Uintah Band was not 
a federally recognized tribe, or give any analysis as to how the 
Uintah Band could be considered to have status with the federal 
government given the Reber holding that it did not. Therefore, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-201(6)(c) does not apply because the Uintah Band is 
not a federally recognized Indian tribe. 
14. Counsel's Memorandum also did not address the holding in Hagen v. 
Utah. In Hagen, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved conflicting decisions 
between the 10th Circuit and the Utah Supreme Court which interpreted 
various acts of congress enacted between 1902 and 1905 concerning the 
Uintah Indian Reservation (which previously enclosed the area where 
this crime is alleged to have occurred) . 510 U.S. 399 (1994) . The 
10th Circuit in the Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah had held that the 
legislation had not diminished the reservation. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th 
Cir. 1985). In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court in Perank construed the 
same language to mandate diminishment of the historic boundaries of 
the reservation. 858 P. 2d 927 (Utah 1992) . The Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that the State had jurisdiction over lands which had been 
returned to the public domain by congress. 85 8 P. 2d at 93 9. The 
Hagen Court observed that u[t]he operative language of the 1902 Act 
nnnno 
provided for allocations of reservation lands to Indians, and that 
xall the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to 
the public domain.'" 510 U.S. at 412. The Coilirt observed that Mo] ur 
cases considering operative language of restoration have uniformly 
equated it with a congressional purpose to terminate reservation 
status." Id. at 413 (emphasis added). The Coiirt held: "In light of 
our precedents, we hold that the restoration of unallotted reservation 
lands to the public domain evidences a congres$ional intent with 
respect to those lands inconsistent with the continuation of 
reservation status. Thus, the existence of sufch language in the 
operative section of a surplus land Act indicates that the Act 
diminished the reservation." Id. at 414 (emphasis added). 
In reaching its decision, the Hagen Court relied on 
interpretations given to the Act by public officials who were charged 
with implementing the Act, including U.S. Indi|an Inspector James 
McLaughlin. Id. at 417. "You say that [the Reservation boundary] 
line is very heavy and that the reservation iq nailed down on the 
border. That is very true as applying to the |past many years and up 
too now, but congress has provided legislation which will pull up the 
nails which hold that line and after next yearf there will be no 
outside boundary line to this reservation." %d. The Court then noted 
that "Inspector McLaughlin's picturesque phrase reflects the 
contemporaneous understanding . . . that th^ reservation would be 
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diminished by operation of the 1902 and 1903 Acts . . . ." Id. The 
Hagen Court affirmed the Utah Supreme Court, and overruled the 
conflicting interpretation which the 10th Circuit had given to the 
1902 through 1905 Acts. Given the pronouncements in Hagen that the 
effect of the operative language in the Act was to terminate the 
reservation status, there is no longer an outer boundary to the Uintah 
Indian Reservation. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(6) (c) does 
not apply because it requires that the offense occur within the outer 
boundaries of a reservation. 
15. Congress enacted the Ute Indian Termination Act ("UTA") in 
exercise of its plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. 25 
U.S.C. § 677. The Act provided: *[T]he Secretary shall publish in the 
Federal Register a proclamation declaring that the Federal trust 
relationship to such person is terminated. Thereafter, such person 
shall not be entitled to any of the services performed for Indians 
because of his status as an Indian. All statutes of the United States 
which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no 
longer be applicable . . . and the laws of the several States shall 
apply to such member in the same way as they apply to other citizens 
within their jurisdiction." 25 U.S.C. § 677v (emphasis added). 
Counsel raised the UTA in his Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss and argued that the effect of the UTA was to expel the Uintah 
Band from the Ute Tribe. p. 8-9. Consequently, Counsel was clearly 
r\ n r\ «i -7/t 
aware of the UTA and its provisions. However, Counsel entirely failed 
to address that the UTA terminated the Indian status of those who were 
listed on the termination proclamation. 
16. Counsel regularly represents persons who qlaim to be Indians for 
the purposes of criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
17. The argument that the UTA expelled the Uihtah Band from the Ute 
Indian Tribe is not new to this case. Counsel raised this issue in 
his brief to the Supreme Court in Reber. Opening Brief of Respondents 
and Cross-Petitioners on Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals p. 15 (Oct. 13, 2006)x . The Reber Coilirt was therefore 
informed of this argument and clearly did not find the argument to be 
persuasive. Indeed, the Court's determination! that Rogers controlled 
the issue of Indian status and the Court's holding that the Uintah 
Band is not a federally recognized Indian trit*c is, by implication, a 
rejection of the expulsion argument. Because the argument was before 
the Supreme Court when it decided Reber, it i£ apparent that the 
Supreme Court did not find anything in the expulsion argument which 
would change the results reached in Reber. Given the history of the 
argument and understanding that Counsel knew d>f this history, Counsel 
1
 Although the title of this brief indicates it was before the 
Utah Court of Appeals, it was not. The brief was before the Utah 
Supreme Court and was addressed to the Utah Supreme Court. Also, 
the brief was filed with the Utah Supreme Court on October 13, 
2006, after the Utah Court of Appeals had made! its decision on the 
Reber matter in 2005. 
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had a clear obligation to cite to Reber when presenting the expulsion 
argument to this court. 
18. The Reber decision was announced to the parties on April 24, 
2007. The certificate of mailing shows that Counsel was also sent a 
copy of the decision on that date. The motion to dismiss in this 
matter was filed on December 12, 2007. 
Analysis 
The Rogers and Reber cases are clearly dispositive of all issues 
raised by Counsel in the Motion to Dismiss, and are binding precedent 
when determining Indian status under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Each theory 
presented (expulsion and Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(6) (c) ) ultimately 
rely on the premise that Mr. Clark had been recognized by a federally 
recognized tribe (the Uintah Band) and that membership in an Indian 
tribe is, in and of itself, enough to establish Indian status. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court held in Reber, that the Uintah Band is 
not a federally recognized Indian tribe. Therefore, Mr. Clark does 
not meet the second requirement announced in the Rogers case 
(recognition). Rogers also requires a showing of a significant degree 
of Indian blood. In spite of this, Counsel did not claim that Mr. 
Clark had any Indian blood. Therefore, Mr. Clark does not meet the 
first requirement of Rogers (Indian blood). In this case Counsel 
failed to even raise facts which would support either requirement of 
Rogers. 
Expulsion 
Counsel's theory of expulsion is premised on the allegation that 
the UTA expelled a majority of the members of the Uintah Band and that 
when a majority of the membership of an entity is expelled, this 
constitutes expulsion of the entity itself. Ih support of this 
allegation, Counsel alleges that members and npnmembers (who were 
eligible for membership) were expelled. 
Clearly, persons who have never been members of the Ute Tribe 
could not be expelled from the Tribe by operation of the UTA. As 
Counsel recognized in his Memorandum, it is the prerogative of an 
Indian Tribe to determine its own memberships. Def.'s Memo, in 
Support Mot. Dismiss p. 10. Because the Ute Tlribe has never 
recognized these individuals to be members, thley cannot be included as 
members for the purposes of determining a perclentaae of members who 
lost their memberships as a result of the UTA. 
Counsel also argues that certain members of the Uintah Band were 
expelled by operation of the UTA. However, tHe effect of the UTA was 
to terminate the Indian status of persons who were listed on the 
termination proclamation, which in turn termiiiated their association 
with the Tribe and their memberships in the Utie Tribe. When they left 
the Tribe they did not take their memberships with them. By act of 
congress, which has plenary powers in these matters, these individuals 
were no longer entitled to memberships in the Uintah Band. Logic does 
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not allow that such individuals be treated as members for any purposes 
including the calculations offered by Counsel. As they no longer had 
the status as "Indians" (in or out of the Ute Tribe) they were no 
longer members of the Uintah Band (whether the Uintah Band is 
considered to be in or out of the Ute Tribe). 
As stated above, Rogers and Reber are dispositive of the claims 
of expulsion. Even assuming that the Uintah Band was expelled as 
alleged by Counsel, the Uintah Band is not recognized as an Indian 
tribe by the federal government. Even assuming that the Uintah Band 
was expelled, Mr. Clark does not claim to be an Indian. Because Mr. 
Clark does not claim any Indian blood and is not a member of a 
federally recognized Indian tribe, Mr. Clark is not an Indian for the 
purposes of applying 18 U.S.C. § 1152. In view of Rogers and Reber, 
Counsel's failure to address these cases and the principles of law 
decided in these cases, and Counsel's familiarity with this area of 
the law, the Court finds that the expulsion argument as presented by 
Counsel is frivolous. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(6) (c) 
Counsel concluded his Memorandum with the claim that Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-201(6)(c) precluded State jurisdiction without providing 
any analysis to support his conclusion. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
201(6) (c) applies when: (1) a person is a member of an Indian tribe 
that has legal status with the United States; and (2) the alleged 
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crime was committed within the exterior boundaries of a tribal 
reservation. As indicated above, Reber determined that the Uintah 
Band was not a federally recognized Indian tribe. Therefore, the 
claim that Mr. Clark was a member of the Uintah Band did not bring Mr. 
Clark within the statute. Furthermore, the United States Supreme 
Court has declared that congress has terminated the reservation status 
of what was formerly the Uintah Indian Reservation. See Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) . This reservation nfc> longer exists as a 
reservation. Therefore, the requirement of Utkh Code Ann. § 76-1-
201(6)(c) that the offense occur within an Indian reservation was not 
met. 
As indicated, the statutory argument was (presented without any 
analysis as to how Mr. Clark met the requirements of the statute. 
Again, Reber (which is dispositive) was not ci|ted. Counsel failed to 
address the Rogers requirements or the holding! in Reber that the 
Uintah Band is not federally recognized as an Indian tribe. Counsel, 
who is familiar with this area of Indian law, failed to raise the 
Hagen case (which held that the Uintah Reservation was no longer a 
reservation and had no outer boundary). Based on the circumstances of 
this case, the Court finds that Counsel's argument that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-201 (6) (c) deprived the Court of jurisdiction is frivolous. 
Counsel's Response at the Order to Shfpw Cause Hearing 
In his presentation at the order to show cause hearing, Counsel 
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reminded the Court that: (1) federally recognized tribes have 
authority to determine their own membership; (2) federal courts have 
power to recognize a tribe which has not previously been recognized 
and, when this occurs, the tribe becomes federally recognized; (3) it 
is sometimes necessary to raise certain issues in the trial court to 
preserve the issue for consideration in the federal court on appeal; 
and (4) the issue of whether the Uintah Band should be federally 
recognized is pending in the federal courts. 
However, Counsel has failed to inform the Court as to how any of 
these situations relieve him of his obligations to follow established 
precedent when bringing issues before the court. Nor has he explained 
how any of these situations relieve him of his responsibilities under 
Rule 11(b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The fact that 
federally recognized tribes may determine their own memberships does 
not relieve the Defendant of his obligation to show, under Rogers, 
that Mr. Clark was a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe. 
The fact that a federal court may someday recognize the Uintah 
Band as an Indian tribe also does not relieve the Defendant from 
showing he was a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe at the 
time the offense allegedly occurred. 
Undoubtedly, when a federal appeal is dependent on raising an 
issue before the trial court, counsel may raise the issue. 
Nevertheless, Counsel's motion is presented in this Court and not in 
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federal court. Therefore, Counsel is obligate^ to address controlling 
precedent in this jurisdiction and comply with rules which apply to 
attorneys who practice in State courts. The proceedings in this Court 
cannot be treated as an empty vessel whose only purpose is to give 
passage to the federal courts. 
Finally, the fact that an issue is pending in another 
jurisdiction does not affect the precedential Value of decisions made 
by the highest court of this State. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure |11 (b) (2) 
Before filing his motion to dismiss, Rule 11(b) (2) required 
Counsel to: (1) make a reasonable inquiry into existing law; and (2) 
make a determination after such inquiry that (la) the motion was 
warranted by existing law; or (b) there was a |nonfrivolous argument 
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law. The rule is 
designed to cause attorneys to focus on the merits of an issue before 
bringing the issue before the court. The rula is intended to prevent 
frivolous issues from encumbering courts and fcfurdening opposing 
parties. The rule encourages respect for established precedent by 
requiring attorneys to make a good faith argument as to why precedent 
should not be followed. 
The first requirement of Rule 11(b) (2) i$ that counsel make 
reasonable inquiry as to the existing state 05 the law. As Counsel 
regularly practices within this area of Indian law, it is apparent 
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that he knew of the statutes and case law which would control the 
issues presented. As counsel in Reber, he knew of the Rogers 
requirements and the Reber holding that the Uintah Band was not a 
federally recognized Indian tribe. He sought dismissal under 18 
U.S.C. § 1152; so he knew the requirements of that statute. He cited 
to the UTA; so he knew of 25 U.S.C. § 677v which terminated the Indian 
status of those persons listed on the termination proclamation. He 
was certainly aware of Hagen which is the seminal case on the issue of 
the status of the Uintah Indian Reservation. At the order to show 
cause hearing, Counsel extensively addressed principles of Indian law. 
Clearly, Counsel made reasonable inquiry concerning the law. What is 
not clear is why he did not apply the law to the facts in his motion 
to dismiss. In view of the facts in this case, the Court finds that 
Counsel's failure to address the controlling case law and statutes was 
not a mere oversight. The Court finds that Counsel did not address 
the controlling case law because they did not support the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Rule 11(b)(2) also requires that, after making reasonable 
inquiry, counsel must be able to certify that the motion is permitted 
by: (1) existing law; or (2) by a non-frivolous argument for 
extending, modifying or revoking existing law, or the establishment of 
new law. Here, Counsel could not have certified that he was entitled 
to the relief he claimed under existing law. As stated previously, 
the Rogers and Reber cases were clearly dispositive of all the issues 
presented by Counsel. Even assuming that the T^ intah Band was expelled 
and that Mr. Clark was a member of the Uintah $and, Mr. Clark was not 
an Indian for the purposes of applying 18 U.S. ^ j. § 1152 because Mr. 
Clark did not claim any Indian blood and was nbt a member of a 
federally recognized tribe. As indicated abovte, in view of all the 
facts and circumstances of this case, this argtiment is frivolous. 
Rogers and Reber are also dispositive of the i^sue of jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(6) (c) . Again, because Reber 
determined that the Uintah Band was not federally recognized, Mr. 
Clark (who based his claim on his membership i|n the "expelled" Uintah 
Tribe) did not meet the statutory requirement :hat a defendant be a 
member of an Indian tribe recognized by the fdderal government. As 
noted above, the Hagen case would also preclude the use of the statute 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(6)(c)) as a basis flor depriving the court 
of jurisdiction. The Hagen case had determined that the area where 
this crime occurred was not within the extericir boundaries of an 
Indian reservation. Because the reservation liad no outer boundary 
this crime did not occur within the exterior boundaries of an Indian 
reservation as required by the statute. The <£ourt has found that the 
argument concerning Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201^6)(c) is frivolous. 
Therefore, clearly Mr. Humiston could not certify that he was entitled 
to relief under the existing law as required bv Rule 11(b) (2) . 
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Counsel argues that he brought the Motion to Dismiss as an 
attempt to-extend, modify, or reverse existing law. This argument is 
entirely without merit. There is no hint in the Memorandum that 
Counsel was asking this Court to extend, modify, or reverse Rogers or 
Reber (which are the controlling law). Counsel did not cite to Rogers 
or to Reber and failed to address the principles of law announced in 
these cases. Counsel did not apply the facts, which he alleged 
supported his Motion, to the principles of law established in Rogers 
and Reber. Counsel did not give this Court any analysis or argument 
which would support the claim that Rogers and Reber did not apply or 
that this Court should not reach the conclusions reached in these 
cases. He just ignored the precedent which was established in each 
case. In addition, he failed to address other controlling case law 
(Hagen) which applied to this case. When an attorney wants to change 
the law, he or she must do the heavy lifting associated with moving 
the law. That starts with recognizing the law as it currently exists. 
An attorney then must analyze the facts and circumstances as they 
relate to the existing law, and discuss the policy considerations 
which support changing the law. Finally, an attorney who wants to 
change the law must actually ask that the law be changed. In this 
case, it cannot be fairly said that the Motion was presented as a 
request to change, extend or reverse Rogers or Reber. 
Based on the above, the Court finds that Mr. Humiston violated 
Rule 11(b) (2) when he brought the Motion to Dismiss. In view of 
Counsel's familiarity with Indian law, his faiJLure to raise Rogers and 
Reber was not merely negligent but was intentional. Having found Mr. 
Humiston in violation of Rule 11(b) (2) the Coujrt will impose 
sanctions. Based on all the circumstances of this case Mr. Humiston 
is ordered to pay $700 as a sanction, which (upiless Counsel applies 
for and is granted an extension based on an injability to pay) must be 
paid within 3 0 days of the mailing of this rul|ing and order. 
, 2008 
BY THE COURT 
JUJ^ 
A. LYNN PAYN|E, D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
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Addendum G 
MICHAEL L. HUMISTON #6749 FILED 
Attorney for Defendant ^OH^TJo^lj^ 
23 West Center Street 'Y> UT~H 
P.O. Box 486 DtC 1 12006 
Heber City, Utah 84032 JOANNEMcKEE a t=nu-
Tel: (435) 654-1152 e y , * ,UU=flK 
TT^ DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, MOTION TO| DISQUALIFY 
Plaintiff, JUDGE A. L^NN PAYNE 
vs. 
: Case No. 06li00204 
JESSE D. CLARK, 
Defendant : Judge A. Lynri Payne 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and pursuant to Rule 29(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, respectfully moves that the Hon. A. Lynn Payne be 
disqualified from presiding in the above-entitled matter. 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF, Defendant respectfully states the following: 
1. The information commencing this action in the District Ciourt was filed on or about 
November 28, 2006. 
2. Pursuant to Rule 29(c)(1)(B), this motion has been filed (within 20 days of (i) 
assignment of the action to Judge Payne, and (ii) appearance of the defendant's attorney. 
3. Defendant respectfully submits herewith the affidavits offMicKael L. Humiston, Calvin 
C. Hackford, LaVae Hackford, and Richita M. Butler setting forth! facts sufficient to show bias 
and prejudice. 
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DATED this 7th day of December, 2006. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion to Disqualify Judge A. Lynn Payne was 
mailed to Stephen Foote, Deputy Duchesne County Attorney, at P.O. Box 206, Duchesne, Utah 
84021, this 7th day of December, 2006. 
Michael L. Humiston 
0000?} 
MICHAEL L. HUMISTOi. *6749 
Attorney for Defendant 
23 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 486 
Heber City, Utah 80432 
Tel: (435) 781-6565 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF ^JTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT O^ CALVIN C 
Plaintiff, HACKFORD 1^ SUPPORT OF 
: MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
vs. 
: Case No. 021800320 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant : Judge A. Lynn P^yne 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
Calvin C. Hackford, being duly sworn upon his oath, states aijd affirms as follows: 
1.1 am an eyewitness to the events described herein, which occurred in regard to my 
daughter, LaVae Jptackford, in the period between 1987 through 1992,. 
2. During this period, I testified under oath before Judge Lyni^  Payne, that I am a member 
of the Uintah Band of Indians, and that my daughter is a member by }ight of birth. 
3. When I so stated, Judge Payne blatantly interrupted and said that to his knowledge, 
"there is no Uintah Band, and there never has been." 
4. This statement was made by Judge Payne without any evidence being admitted to 
support it, and without any question or objection pending by counsel 
5.1 was still under oath and still seated on the stand. Out of rfespect for what a court is 
i. y 
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supposed to be, I did not call Judge Payne a liar, although his statement was exactly that. 
6.1 do not believe there is anything honorable about a judge who will insinuate to the 
entire courtroom that a witness under oath is not telling the truth, when the judge can prohibit the 
witness from rebutting the insinuation. 
DATED this %9 day of October, 2003. 
Calvin C. Hackford u / ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this £ 7 day of October, 2003. 
/ (<f>^z*m NOTARY PUBLIC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Calvin C. Hackford in Support of 
Motion to Disqualify Judge was mailed to Edwin T Peterson, Deputy Uintah County Attorney, at 
152 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, this 3rd day of November, 2003. 
Michael L. Humiston 
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Attorney for Defendant 
23 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 486 
Heber City, Utah 80432 
Tel: (435) 781-6565 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF ^JTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT Of LaVAE HACKFORD 
Plaintiff, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
: DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
vs. 
: Case No. 021800320 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant : Judge A. Lynn P^yne 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
LaVae Hackford, being duly sworn upon her oath, states and Affirms as follows: 
1. Between the years 1988 and 1996 I was in and out of the courts in Duchesne County 
with the State of Utah on licensing and taxation issues. The case wasifirst before Judge Dennis 
Draney and then before Judge Lynn Payne. 
2.1 endured, for nine years, the continual violation of my rights, not just as a Uintah, but 
also as a citizen within the jurisdiction of the Ute Indian Tribe. 
3.1 was repeatedly told by both judges that they were not boukd by federal law, only by 
state lav/. 
4. They took it upon themselves to determine if I was "Indiann or not by setting a blood 
quantum for the Uintahs and then telling me I did not meet it. 
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5. Stated concisely, I am a Uintah residing on my reservation that is being governed by 
the Ute Indian Tribe. I was licensed by the Ute Tribe to do business on the reservation. Without 
question, the Ute Tribe had jurisdiction to issue me a license. 
6. The state and county entities would not acknowledge this license and even went so far 
as to attempt to foreclose and sell my property on the reservation in order satisfy fabricated debts. 
7. The only relief I obtained was when I petitioned the Justice Department in Washington, 
D.C. Although I never received a direct response from the Justice Department, within 30 days of 
my petition my name was removed from the state records and the so-called debts were listed on 
paper as "satisfied." 
8. I have experienced the "justice" of the court system under Judge Payne, and if ever I 
find myself there again, I know my battle will be against his belief system, right or wrong. I have 
always and will continue to stand on the facts. My rights are reserved by the Act of Congress of 
May 5, 1864 (13 Stat. 63). Judge Payne does not recognize these rights. 
DATED this 3? day of October, 2003. 
/ / 
LaVae Hackford 
P.O. Box 495, Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3 f day of October, 2003. 
^*5r?>^ Notary Public • 
I F # « M R l o ! - 10 North 200 East -(Si mmm }3 Roosevelt, Utah 84068 I Roosevelt, Utah 84068 I ^ \ / /) r \ \ \\ 
l a S B ^ T M n mm%^%S!^aiim • • M i T A R Y PUBLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of LaVae Hackfjbrd in Support of Motion 
to Disqualify Judge was mailed to Edwin T. Peterson, Deputy Uintah County Attorney, at 152 
East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, this 3rd day of November, 2003. 
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MICHAEL L. HUMISTON #6749 
Attorney for Defendant 
23 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 486 
Heber City, Utah 80432 
Tel: (435) 781-6565 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT OF RICHITA M. BUTLER 
Plaintiff, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
: DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
vs. 
: Case No. 021800320 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant : Judge A. Lynn P^yne 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
Richita M. Butler, being duly sworn upon her oath, states and (affirms as follows: 
1. The following is my eyewitness account concerning my tw(j> sons, as I personally 
observed in a court administered by Judge A. Lynn Payne. 
2. Judge Payne sat in court and ordered the percentage of Indian blood on Richard 
Dewray Hackford to be presented and documented. Judge Payne thenj took it upon himself to 
figure Richard's degree of Indian blood, after eliminating all his bloo|i degree from Richard's 
natural father's family, which was all Paiute and Shoshone Bannock, (judge Payne then removed 
all claimed Ute blood from Richard's mother's side. After all of his personal attempts at 
eliminating and reconfiguring Richard's blood degree, Judge Payne admitted that Richard was 
still one fourth or more Indian, with his mother's Sioux Indian degree. 
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3. Judge Payne then stated, "However, for the purpose of this court, Richard is not found 
to be an Indian, and is indeed subject to my court. You can quote federal regulations til you are 
blue in the face. I am not bound by federal laws. I only adhere to state law." With that, Richard's 
case continued under state jurisdiction. 
4. Judge Payne apparently assumes the sole power to change any individual's status from 
Indian to Caucasian. He changes an individual's nationality, race, culture, and heritage so that his 
court can assume state jurisdiction. 
5. After Judge Payne determined that my sons were white, my son Nathan Samuel Collett 
was assaulted by an officer in the Duchesne County Jail for raising the issue of his Indian status 
in court. My sons learned the hard way that if Judge Payne says you're white, you'd better leave 
it that way or stand the chance of being beat to a pulp. 
DATED this ^ 2 7 day of October, 2003. 
/2Lc/utdh^7 &uf(c\ 
) .f _ V , 'V- ~" j RichitaM. Butler 
L~Lzi. . . _ -r::SjLf.': ~ V J _ j 8 2 0 E a s t 300 North (113-10) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J 7 day of October, 2003. 
/ -7 sf J 
/ y, i f s\^j — 
'NOTARY PUBLIC / 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Richita M. Bjutler in Support of Motion 
to Disqualify Judge was mailed to Edwin T. Peterson, Deputy Uintah County Attorney, at 152 
East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, this 3rd day of November, 2003. 
^ 7 r- •? 
Michael L. Humis 
OOOQiq 
MICHAEL L. HUMISTON #6749 
Attorney for Defendant 
23 West Center Street 
P O. Box 486 
Heber City, Utah 80432 
Tel: (435) 654-1152 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DUCHESNE DEPARMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, AFFIDAVIT 0F MICHAEL L. 
Plaintiff, HUMISTON JN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION Td DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
vs. 
: Case No. 0618^ 00204 
JESSE D. CLARK, 
Defendant : Judge A. Lynnl Payne 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Michael L. Humiston, being duly sworn upon his oath, states and affirms as follows: 
1.1 am counsel for the Defendant in the above-entitled mattler. 
2.1 have personal knowledge of the conduct of the Hon. Aj Lynn Payne set forth herein. 
3. Over the past several years, I have represented numerous1 persons who are members of 
the Uintah Band of Indians. 
4.1 addition to the current case, I previously represented Joe Valdez, Rick Reber, Tex 
Atkins, and Steve Thunehorst in criminal proceedings before Judge Payne. 
5. In all of these cases, the defendants challenged State jurisdiction due to the defendants' 
status as members of the Uintah Band acting on Indian land. 
FILED 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
DEC I 1 20Q6 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
.DEPUTY 
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6. In all of the cases, Judge Payne went to extraordinary lengths to uphold State 
jurisdiction despite clear law and evidence to the contrary. 
7. In the jurisdiction hearing on Joe Valdez on March 7, 2000, the judge himself elicited 
testimony that Mr. Valdez's father was Navajo, thus demonstrating that Mr. Valdez was 31/32 
Indian by descent, and legally an Indian by all known standards. Judge Payne then immediately 
ruled that the evidence must be excluded because it was not provided to the State in pretrial 
discovery. Judge Payne was not concerned that the evidence had not been provided to the defense 
either. 
8. When the case was subsequently appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, the State was 
represented by assistant attorney general Joanne Slotnik. Upon reviewing the trial court 
proceedings and finding Judge Payne had ruled that Mr. Valdez was not an Indian, Ms. Slotnik 
called me and asked, "How did the judge do this?" The State subsequently moved to reverse the 
decision. State v. Valdez, 65 P.3d 1191 (Utah App. 2003). 
9. In association with other trial court proceedings concurrent with State v. Valdez, Mr. 
Valdez was required to post $600.00 bail for failure to appear at a hearing for which he never 
received notice and to pay a fine on a charge for which he was never convicted. Judge Payne 
would not order this money released until after a complaint was filed with the Department of 
Administrative Services and the Department sent a letter indicating that the money must be 
returned. 
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10. The Court of Appeals' ruling in Valdez left open the possibility that the State could 
still charge Mr. Valdez with a lesser included offense, notwithstanding the ruling's clear statement 
regarding the limits of State jurisdiction over Indian lands. Upon redeiving the remittitur from the 
Court of Appeals, Judge Payne urged Jo Ann Stringham, the Uintah County Attorney, to refile 
charges against Mr. Valdez. Ms. Stringham graciously declined to db so. 
11. At the initial appearance in State v. Reber, Judge Payne Was informed that the 
Defendant would be challenging jurisdiction, and that a separate hearing would be necessary. The 
judge's response was that a separate hearing would not be necessary because, "I know all about 
the Uintah Band." Numerous separate hearings subsequently proved! to be necessary, in all of 
which Judge Payne steadfastly refused to address any issue or receive any evidence whatsoever 
regarding the Uintah Band. At the conclusion of these pretrial proceedings, Judge Payne found 
jurisdiction, again notwithstanding substantial evidence and law to tlhe contrary. 
12. Judge Payne's jurisdiction ruling in Reber was subsequdntly overturned by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. State v. Reber, 2005 UT App. 485, 128 P.3d 12|l . 
13. The Reber case involved hunting by a member of the Uintah Band on land which the 
federal courts have declared to fall under tribal jurisdiction. The Utte Tribe is openly hostile to the 
Uintah Band, a fact commonly known throughout the Uintah Basiq, and which the Ute Tribe has 
acknowledged in its subsequent amicus briefs before the Utah Couit of Appeals and the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
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14. Injury selection before trial in the Reber case, one potential juror indicated that he was 
a member of the Ute Tribe, a former wildlife officer for the Ute Tribe, and that he had strong 
feelings about the Uintah Band. Notwithstanding these blatant indications of bias, Judge Payne 
strenuously resisted all efforts to disqualify the juror for cause, only granting the motion after 
extensive argument. 
15. The Court of Appeal's ruling in Reber was based upon its previous ruling in State v. 
Valdez. In pretrial hearings before Judge Payne in the Reber matter, the Valdez issue was the 
subject of a separate briefing and hearing. At the hearing, I presented the relevant language from 
Valdez as a courtroom exhibit on an easel in large print, the only such exhibit I ever presented 
throughout the entire trial court proceedings. Nevertheless, after the Court of Appeals issued its 
ruling in Reber, Judge Payne expressed astonishment to me over the Court of Appeals rationale, 
stating, "You didn't argue that issue before me, did you? Did you argue that issue before me?" 
16. In each of the jurisdiction proceedings in the Valdez, Reber, and related cases, Judge 
Payne relied obsessively and exclusively on his perception of blood quantum, and specifically 
would not rule on any issues pertaining to the Uintah Band. I believe that Judge Payne did not 
remember the easel presentation, which ultimately decided the Reber case on appeal, because the 
argument in that trial court hearing had nothing to do with blood quantum. 
17. Blood quantum has played no role whatsoever in the Court of Appeals' holdings in 
Valdez and Reber, and has no relevance to any of the arguments currently pending before the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reber, Case No. 20060299-SC. 
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18. Blood quantum is neither the primary nor the determining factor in determining 
whether a person is an Indian for purposes of State jurisdiction. *c[Tl]he terms concerning "blood," 
such as "full-blood," "mixed-blood," "blood quantum," and related quantitative terms such as 
"half-breed," are . . . without scientific basis." The Arbitrary Indian] Gail K. Sheffield, University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1997, page 83. "[T]he use of blood quantum tq define the modern Indian 
population poses enormous conceptual and practical problems," Aiherican Indians: The First of 
this Land, Matthew C. Snipp, New York: Russell Sage Foundation^ 1989, page 44. 
19. The U.S. Census Bureau does not require any blood quantum in determining Indian 
status. The Arbritary Indian, supra, pages 86-87. 
20. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, the definitive authority on Indian law, 
states: "In dealing with Indians, the federal government is dealing ^rith members or descendants of 
political entities, that is, Indian tribes, not with persons of a particular race." F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, (1982 ed.), page 19, citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 
641, 646 (1977)(Emphasis added). 
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based ubon impermissible 
[racial] classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status of 
Indians as "a separate people" with their own political institutions. Federal 
regulation of tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political 
communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "'racial5 group consisting of 
'Indians' 
Id., citing Morton v. Mancait 417 U.S. 535, 553, n.24 (1^74). See also Cohen, page 654. 
"The Court has also supported its holdings in these cases bjy characterizing Indians in 
federal law as a political rather than as a racial classification. The Court said that Indian laws 
OOnmc 
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apply by virtue of tribal membership rather than because of the race of the parties/' Cohen, page 
655, citing Fisher v. District Court. 424 U.S. 382, 391-91 (1976), Morton v. Mancaii supra. 
21. Race is synonymous with ancestry. The Arbitrary Indian, supra, page 133. Judge 
Payne continually relies on the racial factor to the exclusion of all others. 
22. In contrast to Judge Payne's racial approach, individual status follows tribal status, 
and there can be no Indian without a tribe. See Eppsv Andrus, 611 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1979). 
"The tribal experience — the collective experience — is the essence of being Indian in this modern 
world. There are, as we have seen, tribes that function as such in the sociocultural sense, even if 
they are not recognized by the federal government as sovereign political entities." The Arbitrary 
Indian, supra, page 95. "The courts have consistently recognized that one of an Indian tribe's 
most basic powers is the authority to determine questions of its own membership. . . . The power 
of an Indian tribe to determine questions of its own membership derives from the character of an 
Indian tribe as a distinct political entity." Cohen, supra, page 20. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32 (1978). 
23. In the Valdez, Reber, Atkins, and Thunehorst cases, Judge Payne was repeatedly 
presented with evidence and argument regarding the status of the Defendants' Mbe. The status of 
that tribe, without any reference to their blood quantum, is currently pending before the Utah 
Supreme Court. Mr. Clark, the Defendant in the current action, is challenging State jurisdiction 
based on his membership in that same tribe. 
ooooi 
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24. It is apparent that Judge Payne always rules against members of the Uintah Band, that 
he always refuses to even address, let alone acknowledge, the existence of the Uintah Band, that 
he always imposes his own, extralegal beliefs regarding blood quantum, and that, even when 
presented with evidence of 97% Indian blood, as in the Valdez case, he always finds State 
jurisdiction over members of the Uintah Band. 
25. Judge Payne's beliefs regarding blood quantum and racej however deeply or sincerely 
felt, or from whatever source derived, are entirely out of harmony With the law. His prejudice 
against the Uintah Band is specific and demonstrated. His bias prevents him from addressing any 
Indian issue objectively, and he should therefore be disqualified froni presiding over this matter. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2006. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of December, 2006. 
NOTARY PUBOC 
oooou 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KATHYBAUM 
1344 WlMt 4675 South 
0«*ft.UtafcM40S 
Mv CMMriMfcm EiBiras 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Michael L. Humiston in Support of 
Motion to Disqualify Judge was mailed to Stephen Foote, Deputy Duchesne County Attorney, at 
P.O. Box 206, Duchesne, Utah 84021, this 7th day of December, 2006. 
Michael L Humiston 
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